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Raising the Standard:  Antitrust 
Scrutiny of Standard-Setting Consortia 
in High Technology Industries 
Douglas D. Leeds* 
 
 People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for 
merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in con-
spiracy against the publick, or in some contrivance to raise 
prices. 
  — Adam Smith 
   THE WEALTH OF NATIONS1 
INTRODUCTION 
In September of 1995, nine of the largest consumer elec-
tronics manufacturers in the world, including such power-
houses as Sony, Phillips, Toshiba, and JVC, jointly an-
nounced that they had reached agreement on a standard 
format for the next generation of audio/video compact discs 
(“CDs”), to be known as digital video discs (“DVDs”).2  The 
agreement was widely hailed both by its participants and by 
the potential consumers of the new discs, the producers of 
entertainment and computer “software,” for it meant that the 
consortium had averted a format fight similar to the one be-
 
* Associate, Thelen, Marrin, Johnson & Bridges, L.L.P., San Francisco, CA.  
University of California, Berkeley, B.A. 1992; Georgetown University Law Cen-
ter, J.D., 1996.  The author would like to thank Judith Whalley, Jonathan B. Baker, 
Steven Salop, John Shennefield, Joseph Kattan, Robert Pringle, Wynne Carvill, 
and Tracy Leeds for their help and inspiration in preparing this Essay. Any er-
rors are the author’s alone. 
1.  ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 145 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1976). 
2.  Peter M. Nichols, Home Video, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1995, at D17. 
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tween the VHS and Betamax standards3  over a decade ago.4 
Antitrust officials at the Department of Justice (“Justice 
Department”) were initially less enthusiastic about the 
agreement.  They were already investigating two of the par-
ties to the agreement, Sony and Phillips, over practices the 
two firms used to jointly license the current CD technology.5  
However, when the consortium agreed to relax the restric-
tions placed on the licensees of the new technology and to 
lower licensing fees, the new format won the blessing of the 
Justice Department.6 
The Justice Department’s response to the DVD consor-
tium was consistent with the 1995 Department of Jus-
tice/Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) Antitrust Guide-
lines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property applicable to 
standard-setting consortia.7  The response was also no more 
strict than that which European antitrust enforcers would 
have taken.8  As discussed below,9 the concerns of the U.S. 
and European antitrust enforcement agencies are generally 
satisfied when outside firms are permitted open access to the 
standards established by these horizontal agreements to set 
“interface” or “interoperability” standards.10  However, this 
 
3.  See John M. Ketteringham, In Introducing Business Concepts, Aggressiveness 
Doesn’t Always Work:  Development of 2 VCR Systems Is a Classic Case, L.A. TIMES, 
Feb. 15, 1987, § 4, at 3. 
4.  See, e.g., Mike Langberg, Dawning of DVDs Age:  New Technology Expected 
to Debut Within Six Months May Render CD-ROMs Obsolete, SAN JOSE MERCURY 
NEWS, Jan. 14, 1996, at 1F; Jim Kirk, New Disks Expected to Replace VCRs:  9 Firms 
Unveil Standard Format, CHI. SUN TIMES, Dec. 10, 1995, at 60. 
5.  Dennis Kneale, Sony-Philips Pact on CD-Licensing Fees Is Target of U.S. An-
titrust Investigation, WALL ST. J., July 12, 1994, at A3. 
6.  Philips, Sony Ease DVDs Restrictions, ELECTRONIC BUYERS’ NEWS, Jan. 2, 
1996, at 44. 
7.  See infra part II.A; see also infra note 78. 
8.  See infra part II.B. 
9.  See infra part II. 
10.  Interface or interoperability standards specify how one product or type 
of product will fit or communicate with other products or types of products.  See 
infra text accompanying note 15 (further defining interface standards).  This Es-
say does not discuss other types of standards that may be set by agreements be-
tween horizontal competitors, such as safety standards.  A safety standard sets 
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permissive approach is likely to miss some of the potentially 
serious anticompetitive harms caused by such agreements.11 
Furthermore, without tougher scrutiny, consortia can poten-
tially manipulate these standards to serve anti-competitive 
ends.12 
Part I of this Essay describes the pro-competitive benefits, 
as well as the potential anticompetitive harms, of horizontal 
standard-setting consortia in high technology industries un-
der an open licensing regime.  Part II discusses the scrutiny 
applied to these consortia by the U.S. and European antitrust 
enforcement agencies.  Part III analyzes the practical prob-
lems of crafting a more encompassing antitrust review.  Fi-
nally, Part IV of this Essay offers a model for providing 
greater scrutiny of standard-setting consortia by replacing 
virtual per se validity of open access standard-setting con-
sortia with a “quick look” rule of reason approach coupled 
with an examination of the standard-setting process. 
I. STANDARD-SETTING IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES 
A. Pro-Competitive Benefits of Standardization 
As noted above, agreements between horizontal competi-
tors that set interoperability standards are generally inocu-
lated from the careful scrutiny given to most other types of 
express agreements between horizontal competitors, such as 
agreements relating to terms of sale or products to be sold.13 
This is because interoperability standardization has recog-
nized and significant pro-competitive benefits.  Before ex-
plaining these benefits, though, it is important to define the 
                                                                                                                                  
the characteristics a product must have to be sold in a market or earn certifica-
tion from a certifying entity.  Safety standards differ in important ways from in-
terface standards and raise many unique antitrust problems.  See generally  Harry 
S. Garcia, Federal Antitrust Law and Trade and Professional Association Standards and 
Certification, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 471 (1994). 
11.  See infra notes 81-85, 89-91 and accompanying text. 
12.  See infra part I.B. 
13.  See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text. 
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term “interoperability.” 
Quite simply, interoperability is the capacity of the prod-
ucts of one vendor to communicate, or interface, directly 
with the products of competing suppliers or with comple-
mentary products.14  An example of interoperable competing 
products is the floppy disk, which personal computer users 
can trade amongst themselves, even if their disks or disk 
drives are produced by different manufacturers.15  This in-
teroperability is possible because the disks and drives are 
made to standard specifications.  An example of interopera-
bility of complementary products is the thirty-five millime-
ter film that fits into a standard camera.  Camera manufac-
turers and film suppliers conform their products to a 
particular standard that allows the camera and film to work 
together. 
Two pro-competitive benefits of interoperability stan-
dardization are easily identifiable.  The first is that stan-
dardization permits easier consumer comparison between 
competing products because the burden of acquiring infor-
mation on the merits of two competing standards is avoided.  
Thus, standardization reduces the cost of acquiring informa-
tion.  Similarly, standardization also eliminates a significant 
factor of product differentiation between competing prod-
ucts, thus facilitating price competition between rival pro-
ducers—an obvious benefit to consumers.16 
The second benefit of standardization is that it avoids in-
efficient duplication of investments in comparable, yet in-
compatible, innovation.17 
 
14.  Joseph Kattan, Standard-Setting in High Technology Industries 1 (1995) 
(unpublished outline, on file with author). 
15.  Id. 
16.  Jack E. Brown, Technology Joint Ventures to Set Standards or Define Inter-
faces, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 921, 922-23 (1993). 
17.  It is by no means obvious, however, that multiple investments in inno-
vation will be inefficient.  In fact, it is the potential for standardization to lead to 
the elimination of efficient investments in innovation that suggests that stan-
dardization can be used as a means to promote anticompetitive ends.  See infra 
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A third, less obvious and more complex, benefit of stan-
dardization results from network effects, or network exter-
nalities.18  To understand these benefits and the potential for 
anticompetitive harm deriving from them, it is first neces-
sary to understand the theory of network externalities. 
Most simply put, “network externality” refers to the con-
cept that the value to a consumer of a particular good de-
pends on the number of users of that good or a complemen-
tary good.19  For example, the value of a telephone to a 
consumer depends on the number of people that can be 
called, or in other words, the number of previous consumers 
of  telephones.20  Similarly, the value of a compact disc 
player depends on the number of compatible discs avail-
able.21  This phenomenon is also known as “positive feed-
back;”22 that is, the decision of early consumers has a posi-
tive feedback on the decision of later consumers.23 
Though the concept of positive feedback does not ini-
tially seem particularly complex or difficult to understand, it 
is, in fact, contrary to the basic assumptions of conventional 
economic theory.  At the heart of conventional economic 
theory is the assumption of “diminishing returns.”24  The 
goods a consumer wishes to purchase are based on the 
goods’ price.  As more consumers desire the same goods, the 
price of those goods will be bid up.  Eventually, some con-
                                                                                                                                  
part I.B. 
18.  Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Should Technology Choice Be a 
Concern of Antitrust Policy?, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 283, 286 (1996). 
19.  Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Are Network Externalities a New 
Source of Market Failure?, 17 RES. L. & ECON. 1, 3 (1995). 
20.  This would be an example of a “direct” network externality.  See Michael 
L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 
424, 424-40 (1985). 
21.  This would be an example of an “indirect” network externality.  See Jo-
seph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 
RAND J. ECON. 70, 70 (1985). 
22.  See, e.g., W. Brian Arthur, Positive Feedbacks in the Economy, 262 SCI. AM. 
92, 92 (1990). 
23.  Id. 
24.  SMITH, supra note 1, 56-58. 
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sumers will not wish to pay the new, higher price and will 
drop out of the bidding.  This, in turn, lowers prices and at-
tracts new consumers.  Eventually, the process reaches an 
equilibrium where the demand for the goods equals their 
supply.  The equilibrium marks the optimal outcome—the 
most efficient use and allocation of resources.25  This is the 
reasoning behind Adam Smith’s “invisible hand”—the sim-
ple “law of supply and demand” taught in any introductory 
economics course.26 
Note, however, how the above model depends on the 
presence of negative feedback:  the more the early consum-
ers desire the goods, the less the later consumers will desire 
the goods because the price will have been bid up.  When 
positive feedback exists, however, the early consumers’ de-
sires positively influence the desires of later consumers.  For 
example, although both VHS and Betamax videotape for-
mats were introduced to the market at about the same time, 
the decision of early consumers to purchase VHS machines 
over Betamax machines led later consumers to also favor 
VHS over Betamax.  Eventually, the early consumers’ deci-
sion led to the near universal adoption of VHS and the vir-
tual extinction of Betamax.27 
Another assumption inherent in conventional economic 
theory is that resources are limited.  If resources were unlim-
ited, every consumer could have their desired good at a low 
price.  But, as resources are exhausted, the remaining re-
sources are bid up, and eventually out of the reach (or the 
desire) of some consumers.  Thus, limited resources will 
constrain even some markets that exhibit network external-
ities.  Consider, for example, the “consumption” of invita-
tions to a party:  a potential party-goer’s desire for an invita-
tion to a party will likely increase as the number of invited 
guests rises.  However, because the party can only accom-
 
25.  Id. 
26.  Id. at 423. 
27.  Arthur, supra note 22, at 92. 
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modate a certain number of people (limited, for example, by 
the host’s financial resources, the size of the venue, or the 
willingness to incur the neighbors’ wrath), the price of an 
invitation (measured, perhaps, in units of effort expended in 
“schmoozing” the host) eventually will outweigh the value 
of the invitation to the consumer. 
High-technology goods, on the other hand, may not face 
the same sort of constraints because the key component of 
such goods is knowledge.28  Knowledge is special in that the 
cost of knowledge generally does not increase with the sup-
ply of the goods it produces.29  For example, the cost of sell-
ing additional disks containing a software program will not 
increase appreciably because the predominate cost of devel-
oping the program—the cost of the knowledge to build the 
program—has already been fully incurred and will not in-
crease with the number of units sold.  By contrast, the host 
contemplating sending out additional invitations will incur 
increased costs due to the need to buy additional inputs 
(which were identified as a bigger venue or additional 
neighborly wrath).  This constraint leads the host to stop is-
suing invitations when the cost of enlarging the party to in-
clude the next guest would exceed the benefit from having 
that guest.  Thus, high-technology goods often exhibit de-
creasing average cost. 
When a good exhibits both decreasing average cost and 
network externalities, a consumer of that good experiences 
positive feedback and the presence of “increasing returns” 
replaces the rule of diminishing returns.30  Markets with in-
creasing returns imply that bigger is better:31  consumers de-
rive more value as the number of users grows.  As a result, 
 
28.  Id. at 93. 
29.  Id. 
30.  Id. 
31.  Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Chicken Little Comes Home to 
Roost:  A Misplaced and Flawed Economic Theory Bedevils Microsoft (visited Mar. 25, 
1997) <http://wwwpub.utdallas.edu/~liebowit/upside.html>. 
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the amount each is willing to spend also grows; because 
costs do not rise, profits increase. 
Interoperability standards provide pro-competitive bene-
fits by creating “networks” of compatible products.  A con-
sumer of any product conforming to the standard will in-
crease the welfare of all current and potential consumers of a 
compatible product, even if different firms manufacture the 
products.  Thus, both suppliers and consumers of network 
goods would prefer the industry to subscribe to a single 
standard.32  This would maximize the network externalities. 
Finally, a fourth procompetitive benefit of interoperabil-
ity standards is that standardization may improve competi-
tion by promoting innovation.  Without a single accepted 
and open standard, firms that wish to improve on current 
technology would be forced to gain acceptance for an entire 
standard, rather than for a compatible product.  Thus, con-
sumers considering whether to adopt the product containing 
the new innovation would be forced to balance technological 
improvement with the loss of network externalities.  If the 
network externalities are strong, the consumer may choose 
to forego adopting the new standard despite the new inno-
vation.  Recognizing this, firms would be less likely to invest 
in innovation. 
However, if a single accepted and open standard exists, 
consumers can adopt compatible technological improve-
ments without surrendering network externalities.  In es-
sence, consumers are free to “mix and match” products con-
forming to that standard,33 a phenomenon that would likely 
 
32.  Note that this preference is only over a technologically equivalent alter-
native standard that is not universally adopted. See Joseph Farrell, Standardiza-
tion and Intellectual Property, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 35, 36 (1989).  When a technologi-
cally superior alternative exists, the consumer must balance the technological 
benefits of adopting the new standard with the costs associated with participat-
ing in a smaller network.  Id.  This balancing can be manipulated toward anti-
competitive ends.  See infra notes 42-77 and accompanying text. 
33.  See Carmen Matutes & Pierre Regibeau, “Mix and Match:”  Product Com-
patibility Without Network Externalities, 19 RAND J. ECON. 221, 222, 226 (1988). 
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stimulate firms’ investment in this “intrastandard” innova-
tion. 
B. Anticompetitive Harms of Standardization 
Despite the substantial benefits of standardization, the 
story of open interoperability standards is not all positive.  
While an increase in intrastandard innovation is possible, 
there is also the very real possibility that, because of the 
open standard, important investments in non-compatible in-
novation will dissipate.34  Commenting on research joint 
ventures, which are similar to standard-setting consortia in 
that a combination of firms agree to pursue a unified re-
search objective,35 the Antitrust Division of the Justice De-
partment noted in 1980:  
Industry-wide research projects that include many or 
all firms in a line of commerce . . . pose antitrust con-
cerns.  These are more likely to restrain competition in 
innovation than more limited projects involving a few 
firms with lesser market shares.  There is dan-
ger . . . that a single project will produce less innova-
tion than will a variety of single and joint efforts em-
ploying alternative approaches.36 
The reduction in extra-standard innovation can lead di-
rectly to anticompetitive injury.  First, consumers are de-
prived of non-compatible technological innovations that 
would have been developed absent the standard.37  Second, 
the reduction of product differentiation eliminates one as-
pect of competition in the market for standardized prod-
 
34.  William E. Cohen, Competition and Foreclosure in the Context of Installed 
Base and Compatibility Effects, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 535, 550 (1996). 
35.  In fact, the danger posed by open standards may actually be greater than 
that posed by joint research projects because in the case of open standards, the 
market share of those firms participating in the standard can reach 100%, thus 
completely eliminating extra-standard competition. 
36.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE CONCERNING RESEARCH JOINT 
VENTURES 11-12 (1980). 
37.  See Farrell, supra note 32, at 37. 
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ucts.38  Reduced product differentiation facilitates coordi-
nated behavior in an industry by reducing the cost vari-
ables—that is, the variance among similar goods produced 
by similar manufacturers.  Reducing the cost variables in-
creases the information available to competitors about com-
peting firms’ pricing strategies and thus deters cheating 
from a coordinated plan.39  Furthermore, because coordina-
tion between firms is already established during the stan-
dard-setting process, additional coordination in pursuit of 
explicitly anticompetitive ends is made easier.40 
The presence of network externalities can actually pro-
mote the anticompetitive harm posed by open interoperabil-
ity standards by providing a mechanism for standard-setting 
consortia to manipulate consumer acceptance of a standard.  
Consortia members could thereby squelch competing inno-
vation and maintain market share in markets that otherwise 
would be characterized by “leapfrogging innovation” and 
rapidly fluctuating market shares.41  The levers that stan-
dard-setting consortia can pull to so manipulate the market 
can be labeled “lock-in effect” and “orphan effect.”42  Both 
labels describe the incentives faced by consumers to pur-
chase network products. 
The lock-in effect, also known as inefficient reluctance to 
adopt or “excess inertia,”43 results from a consumer’s sunk 
investment in the products compatible with a particular 
 
38.  Raymond T. Nimmer, Standards, Antitrust, and Intellectual Property, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTITRUST 1996, at 121, 127-28 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, 
Trademarks & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 449, 1996). 
39.  See, e.g., National Macaroni Mfrs. Ass’n v. FTC, 345 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 
1965) (condemning agreement by trade association members to standardize in-
puts of their products). 
40.  Nimmer, supra note 38, at 124. 
41.  See Richard T. Rapp, How Economists See Competition Problems in High-
Technology Industries, 137 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 139, 145 (1995). 
42.  The orphan effect refers to the desire of consumers to adopt a new stan-
dard because of the fear of being “orphaned” in their current standard.  This fear 
is based on the perception that other consumers are or will be switching to the 
new standard.  See infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text. 
43.  See Farrell & Saloner, supra note 21, at 71. 
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standard.44  As described above, a consumer considering 
whether or not to purchase a good compatible with a new 
standard must balance the benefits of purchase (increase in 
welfare/efficiency from adoption) with the costs of aban-
doning an established standard that has built up significant 
network externalities.  It is possible that, even though every 
consumer would prefer a product based on the new stan-
dard, the cost to the first switchers of abandoning the net-
work, coupled with the uncertainty that other consumers 
would also switch and eventually build up the new network, 
may be so high that no consumers are willing to be the first 
switchers.  Because no one will switch, the new superior 
standard fails to become adopted and the old inferior stan-
dard is locked-in.45 
There is at least anecdotal evidence, often cited, that 
shows that the chance of lock-in is not purely theoretical.46  
Consider the case of the QWERTY keyboard (named for the 
first six letters across the top of the keyboards when read left 
to right) as the standard keyboard configuration.  At the be-
ginning of the century, early typewriters suffered from one 
persistent problem:  the hammers that put the letters on the 
page tended to jam.  The solution to the problem was even-
tually found in arranging the keyboard so as to slow down 
the typist, thus reducing the frequency of the jamming. 
A few years later, just as the typewriter was gaining the 
attention of the public, a well-publicized contest was held in 
Cincinnati to determine the fastest typist.  The contestants 
 
44.  See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 472 
(1992) (recognizing that “lock-in” can be a valid source of competitive harm); cf. 
Digidyne Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1340-41 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding 
market power in aftermarket of computer software); see generally Carl Shapiro, 
Aftermarkets & Consumer Welfare:  Making Sense of Kodak, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 483 
(1995). 
45.  See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY & THE LAW 208-13 (1994). 
46.  See, e.g., Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 18, at 312; Farrell, supra note 
32, at 37-38; Paul David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REW. 
332 (1985). 
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used rival machines which were equipped with different 
keyboard arrangements.  The contestant that used the 
QWERTY format (and was, incidentally, the only one to 
have memorized the keyboard) won.  Soon, typing schools 
began teaching students to memorize the QWERTY format, 
and the standard was set.  In the meantime, the mechanical 
considerations that led to the QWERTY arrangement had 
largely been eliminated, and would be completely elimi-
nated with the advent of electric typewriters and computer 
keyboards. 
Some years later, a new keyboard evolved.  The 
“Dvorak” keyboard was claimed to be more efficient because 
it minimized finger movement, kept the hands on the home 
row as much as possible, and shifted most of the load to the 
stronger fingers.  It was not only easier to learn, but also al-
lowed faster typing, fewer errors, and lowered stress.  Ac-
cording to a study conducted by the United States Navy, in-
vestment in retraining a typist on the Dvorak keyboard 
would be fully repaid ten days after the start of training.47  
Yet, the Dvorak keyboard failed to gain acceptance.  Accord-
ing to one pair of commentators, “[n]o one learns to use the 
Dvorak keyboard because there are so few Dvorak typewrit-
ers, and there are so few Dvorak typewriters because no one 
learns to use the Dvorak keyboard.”48 
What prevented the Dvorak typewriter from developing 
into an industry standard was the potential early switcher’s 
uncertainty of whether other consumers would embrace the 
new standard.  Potential early switchers feared paying the 
high costs of being the first to adopt a new standard (no 
network externalities), effectively locking themselves into 
the then-current standard despite their preference to change. 
The orphan effect, also known as inefficient preference to 
 
47.  See David, supra note 46, at 334 (discussing the Navy’s study). 
48.  Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, We Don’t Know Why She Swal-
lowed The Fly:  Policy and Path Dependence (visited May 27, 1997) 
<http://www.pub.utdallas.edu/~liebowit/regulatn.html>. 
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adopt or “excess momentum,”49 also results from the power-
ful incentives on the consumer to capture network external-
ities.  In this case, although consumers prefer the current 
standard to the new standard—perhaps because the new 
standard requires investment in training or equipment not 
compatible with the old standard and not offset by efficiency 
improvements—they nevertheless adopt the new standard 
for fear of being “stranded” in an ever shrinking network. 
One recent example of the power of the orphan effect 
was the rapid consumer adoption of Microsoft’s “Windows 
95” operating system.  Despite numerous news reports that 
the operating system provided few significant performance 
advancements,50 consumers, computer makers, software de-
velopers, and retailers rushed to switch to the new stan-
dard.51  The rationale for this stampede was the fear of being 
stranded in a shrinking network.  Said one customer at the 
time, “I’ll buy [Windows 95] within the first week it comes 
out.  I want to get up to speed on it, so when people are talk-
ing about it, I’ll know what they’re talking about.”52  Com-
ments such as this evince a motivation for investing in Win-
dows 95 that is directly tied to anticipated network 
 
49.  See Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base and Compatibility:  Inno-
vation, Product Preannouncements and Predation, 76 AM. ECON. R. 940, 942 (1986); 
see also Commentary on the Regulation of New Digital Audio Radio Services:  Hearings 
on Amendment of the Federal Communication Commission’s Rules with Regard to the 
Establishment and Regulation of New Digital Audio Radio Services Before the Federal 
Communication Commission, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 25, 1991) (comment of the 
staff of the Bureau of Economics and the San Francisco Regional Office of the 
FTC). 
50.  See, e.g., Michael J. Miller, Your Next Operating System, PC WK., Sept. 26, 
1995, at 102 (providing extensive test data comparing Windows 95, OS/2 Warp, 
Windows NT, Windows 3.1, and MS-DOS); David Berlind, Be Skeptical of Micro-
soft’s Windows 95 Claims:  Performance and Multitasking Claims for the Operating 
System May Be Overstated, PC WK., July 24, 1995, at 69 (presenting analysis of 
“beta version” of Windows 95). 
51.  See, e.g., Dawn Yoshitake, Computer Makers, Retailers Join Microsoft Band-
wagon:  Special Promotions Churn Anticipation for Windows 95, L.A. DAILY NEWS, 
Aug. 14, 1995, at B1; Jim Erickson, Windows ‘95 Bandwagon Starts to Roll:  QVC 
Channel Leads Market Blitz, S.F. EXAMINER, July 13, 1995, at B1. 
52.  Yoshitake, supra note 51, at B1. 
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externalities. 
As with the lock-in effect, the orphan effect is a reaction 
to uncertainty about other consumers’ preferences.  Con-
sumers, fearful of paying the high costs of being the last 
switcher (no network externalities), rush to join the new 
standard despite their preference not to change. 
When a firm, or a combination of firms, has the power to 
influence consumers’ expectations about the success of a 
new standard, they can effectively manipulate the degree of 
lock-in or orphaning associated with the old standard.  By 
doing so, the firm, or combination of firms, can maintain or 
improve market position. 
For example, during a recent Justice Department investi-
gation, Microsoft was alleged to have engaged in a campaign 
of “vaporware,” or predatory preannouncements of product 
upgrades.53  According to the allegations, because Micro-
soft’s market position made it the de facto standard for cer-
tain software applications, Microsoft prevented rival soft-
ware producers from selling competing products simply by 
announcing that a new Microsoft product was on the hori-
zon.54  Based on these announcements, consumers were re-
luctant to invest in any competing software (a standard) for 
fear that other consumers would purchase Microsoft’s prod-
uct.  As Judge Stanley Sporkin wrote:  
[In the presence of a Microsoft product prean-
nouncement,] consumers and [computer manufactur-
ers] will be reluctant to shift to a new operating sys-
tem, even a superior one, because it will mean not 
 
53.  Although this accusation was not part of the Justice Department’s for-
mal complaint against Microsoft, it was investigated by the Justice Department 
and by the FTC, and it was one of Judge Sporkin’s primary concerns  in rejecting 
the proposed consent decree between Microsoft and the Justice Department.  
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 159 F.R.D. 318, 334 (D.D.C.), rev’d, 56 F.3d 1448 
(D.C. Cir. 1995). 
54.  For some examples of Microsoft’s purported “vaporware” campaign, see 
JAMES WALLACE & JIM ERICKSON, HARD DRIVE:  BILL GATES AND THE MAKING OF THE 
MICROSOFT EMPIRE 382, 392-93 (1992). 
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only giving up on both [their] old operating systems 
and applications, but also risking the possibility that 
there will not be adequate applications to run on the 
superior product.  [Thus] Microsoft can hold onto its 
market share . . . even with the introduction of a com-
petitor’s operating system superior to its own.55 
The effect of the preannouncements was thus to lock-in 
consumers to the current standard by increasing the uncer-
tainty that a rival standard would be adopted.56 
The orphan effect may also flow from business strategies 
that attempt to improve the perception that consumers will 
adopt a standard.  One such strategy is to employ “penetra-
tion pricing.”  Penetration pricing occurs when a firm lowers 
the price of a product to the initial adopters in order to com-
pensate them for the costs of abandoning an existing net-
work.57  Once enough consumers have switched to form an 
attractive new network, the manufacturer can raise the price 
to all future adopters, thus recouping the initial loss.58  By 
aiming the penetration pricing strategy at the members of 
the old network or standard, a firm can reap a double bene-
fit:  in a single move, the firm increases the members of its 
new network while simultaneously reducing the ranks of the 
old network.  Furthermore, incumbent firms that control the 
old standard are in a particularly advantageous position to 
 
55.  Microsoft Corp., 159 F.R.D. at 335. 
56.  See Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig,  An Economic Definition of Pre-
dation:  Pricing & Product Innovation, 91 YALE L.J. 8, 52-53 (1981).  Note, however, 
that there are also pro-competitive aspects of preannouncements, such as inform-
ing customers of product choices and inducing efficient decisions to wait to 
adopt. 
57.  See Farrell, supra note 32, at 43.  For example, home video game manu-
facturers often introduce new hardware platforms with especially attractive li-
censing terms to game developers as an incentive for adopting the new game 
platform.  See generally DAVID SCHEFF, GAME OVER:  HOW NINTENDO CONQUERED 
THE WORLD (1994). 
58.  Note, however, that there are also pro-competitive aspects of penetra-
tion pricing, such as inducing the efficient switching of standards.  Cf. Brooke 
Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993) (indicat-
ing that below-cost pricing is not, in and of itself, anti-competitive). 
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employ this strategy, as they have already- established ac-
cess to the old networks’ members through, for example, ex-
isting distribution channels.59  Thus, the potential for main-
tenance of market share through manipulation of the orphan 
effect is especially ripe. 
Traditionally, commentators believed penetration pricing 
could exist only where the firm employing the strategy, 
known as the sponsor, was in possession of some proprie-
tary technology.60  Such commentators thought the posses-
sion of proprietary technology necessary to prevent other 
firms from free-riding on the sponsor’s investment in estab-
lishing the network.61  Thus, commentators thought penetra-
tion pricing was inappropriate for products based on open 
standards.62  However, recent research has shown that, in 
markets for high-technology goods, consumers tend to iden-
tify newly introduced technology with the trademark of the 
firm that first enters the market.63  This trademark identifica-
tion, resulting from being the “first mover,” is sufficient to 
thwart free-riding, and thus enables the firm to recoup its 
investment in penetration pricing.64 
As mentioned above, the anticompetitive harm posed by 
 
59.  Carl Shapiro, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust 
Div., Antitrust in Network Industries, Remarks Before the American Bar Asso-
ciation-American Law Institute (Jan. 25, 1996) (on file with author). 
60.  Farrell, supra note 32, at 43. 
61.  Id. 
62.  Id. 
63.  See Testimony Before the Federal Trade Commission, Hearings on Global and 
Innovation Based Competition (Nov. 29, 1995) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of 
Esther Dyson) (citing Netscape’s decision to offer free downloads of its web 
browser software as an example of an effort to penetrate a market through brand 
identification); David S. Evans & Bernard J. Reddy, Some Economic Aspects of 
Standards in Network Industries and Their Relevance to Antitrust and Intellectual 
Property Law, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTITRUST 1996, at 177, 192 n.22 (PLI 
Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 
448, 1996). 
64. Hearings, supra note 63 (testimony of F.M. Scherer); cf. Thomas M. Jorde 
& David J. Teece, Rule of Reason Analysis of Horizontal Arrangements:  Agreements 
Designed to Advance Innovation and Commercialize Technology, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 
579, 583 (1993). 
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this manipulation of consumer expectations about the suc-
cess of a standard is that otherwise superior technology, em-
bodied in a competing standard, will be blocked from the 
market despite the preference of consumers to adopt it.  
Analytically, this harm is similar to the theory of predatory 
innovation rejected by the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit in Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.65 
In Berkey Photo, the issue was whether the defendant, 
Kodak, a dominant firm in the camera and film markets, 
could violate the antitrust laws by changing the film/camera 
interface standard.66  The plaintiff, Berkey Photo, alleged 
that this change inhibited a smaller competitor from intro-
ducing technologically innovative products based on the old 
standard.67  Because Kodak was the dominant firm in the in-
dustry, its decision to change standards was sufficient to in-
duce consumer adoption.68  However, the Berkey Photo court 
ruled that, even though one of the purposes of the introduc-
tion of the new standard was to impede competition, “any 
firm, even a monopolist, may generally bring its products to 
market whenever and however it chooses.”69  This position 
has found widespread acceptance in subsequent litigation.70 
The basis of the Berkey Photo holding rests on two tenets.  
First, the court disclaimed the competence to determine 
whether Kodak introduced a new standard to improve tech-
nology (a pro-competitive action) or to inhibit a rival’s inno-
 
65.  603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). 
66.  Id. at 276-78. 
67.  Id. at 279. 
68.  Id. 
69.  Id. at 286. 
70.  See, e.g., ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Machs. 
Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff’d, Memorex Corp. v. International 
Business Machs. Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 972 
(1981) (rejecting the claim that IBM had manipulated the design of its mainframe 
interfaces to defeat compatibility with peripheral equipment made by other 
firms); see generally Ross D. Petty, Antitrust and Innovation:  Are Product Modifica-
tions Ever Predatory?, 22 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 997 (1988). 
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vation (an anti-competitive action).71  As the court noted:  
[N]o one can determine with any reasonable assur-
ance whether one product is ‘superior’ to another.  
Preference is a matter of individual taste.  The only 
question that can be answered is whether there is suf-
ficient demand for a particular product to make its 
production worthwhile, and the response, so long as 
the free choice of consumers is preserved, can only be 
inferred from the reaction of the market.72 
While the reasoning of the Berkey Photo court is generally 
valid, it breaks down in the presence of network external-
ities.  As demonstrated above, the desire to capture network 
externalities, and the fear of losing those externalities, makes 
the “reaction of the market” likely to misrepresent the con-
sumer’s true preference.  Recognizing this, Berkey Photo 
should not be extended to network industries where the 
presence of network externalities coerces consumers by re-
moving their “free choice.”73 
The second tenet underlying Berkey Photo decision is the 
fact that Kodak acted unilaterally.  As the court noted, the 
antitrust laws are applied much more leniently towards sin-
gle-firm conduct than multi-firm conduct.74  For this reason 
as well, the holding in Berkey Photo, which fails to recognize 
the anticompetitive harm associated with unilateral preda-
tory innovation, likely does not reach the similar harms 
 
71.  Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 286-87. 
72.  Id. at 287. 
73.  Cf. Ordover & Willig, supra note 56, at 52-53 (favoring scrutiny of certain 
forms of single firm innovation).  Note, however, that the problem of compe-
tence of the courts to determine when a new standard is pro-competitive or anti-
competitive remains, and perhaps is even made more difficult once reliance on 
market performance is shown to be unreliable.  In this sense, the reluctance of 
the Berkey Photo court to intervene remains valid.  See infra part III; compare Or-
dover & Willig, supra note 56, at 52-53 with Joseph Gregory Sidak, Debunking 
Predatory Innovation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1121 (1983) (arguing for judicial restraint 
in finding antitrust liability in a firm’s efforts to market its innovations). 
74.  Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 304. 
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posed by multi-firm standard-setting consortia.75 
The danger posed by manipulation of the lock-in and or-
phan effects is that a standard-setting consortia can, through 
these mechanisms, establish market dominance for their 
standard, and retain that dominance by introducing succes-
sive “next generation” standards that do not necessarily ad-
vance technology or promote innovation.76  As Carl Shapiro, 
former Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Antitrust 
Division of the Department of Justice, recently stated, “the 
primary method by which today’s network monopolist can 
maintain its monopoly may well be to extend its con-
trol . . . to the next generation of technology.”77  When firms 
are allowed to come together to set standards, which ulti-
mately define each successive generation of technology, they 
indeed establish a ripe environment for producing anticom-
petitive abuses. 
II. UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN UNION ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT REGIMES’ SCRUTINY OF COLLECTIVE 
STANDARD-SETTING BODIES 
As Part I demonstrates, there are both significant and 
substantial pro-competitive benefits and anticompetitive 
 
75.  This is especially likely considering the fact that multi-firm standard-
setting may actually be more likely to induce coercion of consumers than single-
firm conduct because the standards agreement itself will encourage the percep-
tion that the agreed upon standard will be adopted. 
76.  It is interesting to note the recent and growing practice of many software 
makers to use a product’s release year in that product’s title (e.g., Windows 95, 
Microsoft Office 97, Quicken 97, and Lotus Notes 97).  This practice may be gain-
ing popularity because of its potential to manipulate the orphan effect and 
thereby extend a producers’ control of market share into future product genera-
tions.  For example, in 1994 (via preannouncements) and 1995, Windows 95 may 
have appeared attractive to consumers, at least in part, because its name implied 
new technology.  But, by 1999, the same name may invoke a perception of obso-
lescence.  Thus, despite the likelihood that in four years Windows 95 will still be 
technologically sufficient for many or even most users (as well as economically 
efficient compared to the cost of upgrading) consumers may be more inclined to 
upgrade to “Windows 99” due to anxiety over being left with outdated technol-
ogy and a decreasing network of users. 
77.  Shapiro, supra note 59. 
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harms associated with open standard-setting consortia.  Be-
cause of this, and the scrutiny traditionally applied to ex-
press agreements between horizontal competitors, one 
would expect the antitrust enforcement authorities, both in 
the United States and in Europe, to take a close look at such 
consortia.  Nonetheless, in both the United States and in 
Europe, collective standard-setting consortia are virtually 
guaranteed approval without individualized scrutiny, thus 
establishing a prescription for anticompetitive abuse.  This 
part explains the policies of both the United States and the 
European Union toward standard-setting consortia. 
A. United States Enforcement 
Current United States enforcement policy toward stan-
dard-setting consortia derives from the joint Department of 
Justice and FTC (“agencies”) Antitrust Guidelines for the Li-
censing of Intellectual Property (“Guidelines”).78  Section 
3.2.3 of the Guidelines presents the agencies’ treatment of 
innovation markets.79  This section appears to acknowledge 
 
78.  DEP’T OF JUSTICE/FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE 
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY [hereinafter 1995 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
GUIDELINES], reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,132 (Apr. 6, 1995) (issued 
jointly by the Justice Department and the FTC).  While the Guidelines deal ex-
plicitly with licensing agreements and practices, collective open standard-setting 
consortia closely resemble, and may actually include, aspects of patent pooling 
and cross-licensing arrangements that are dealt with in the Guidelines.  Note that 
this Essay is explicitly limited to the treatment of open collective standard-setting 
consortia.  Thus, parallels to licensing arrangements are only relevant where the 
license fee and/or royalty is either “fair and reasonable” or free. As most of the 
Guidelines are concerned with anticompetitive restraints involving fees and/or 
royalties, these sections do not apply to open standard-setting consortia.  This 
fact is the basis for this section’s argument that current enforcement policy to-
wards collective open standard-setting consortia is unwisely weak. 
79.  Section 3.2.3 states, in pertinent part:  
A licensing arrangement may have competitive effects on innova-
tion that cannot be adequately addressed through the analysis of goods 
or technology markets.  For example, the arrangement may affect the 
development of goods that do not yet exist.  Alternatively, the arrange-
ment may affect the development of new or improved goods or proc-
esses in geographic markets where there is no actual or likely potential 
competition in the relevant goods. 
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the potential harm posed by collective standard-setting con-
sortia.  According to one commentator, section 3.2.3 ex-
presses that the “key competitive concern with respect to in-
novation markets is that a reduction in the number of 
independent R&D paths could lead to a slackening of the ef-
forts to develop new products.”80 
While a dearth of new technology may well be the agen-
cies’ concern, the efficacy of the Guidelines to control the 
harm presented by open collective standard-setting consor-
tia is clearly self-limited.  This is true for two reasons.  First, 
the Guidelines expressly indicate that competitive concerns 
are limited to circumstances in which there are four or fewer 
independent entities with the incentives to engage in compa-
rable research and development efforts.81  In network indus-
tries, firms often produce either complementary or rival 
goods that have the potential to engage in non-standard in-
novation.  The incentive to perform this research always ex-
ists in theory because the rewards from implementing the 
next standard can be enormous.  However, in practice, as 
was shown above, the incentive to compete against an open 
standard-setting consortium is marginal because the very 
fact that the consortium exists makes it likely that consumers 
will accept, and adhere to, its standard.82  The Guidelines 
make no distinction between these types of incentives. 
Second, and more importantly, the Guidelines explicitly 
state that the agencies generally will not scrutinize non-
                                                                                                                                  
An innovation market consists of the research and development di-
rected to particular new or improved goods or processes, and the close 
substitutes for that research and development.  The close substitutes are 
research and development efforts, technologies, and goods that signifi-
cantly constrain the exercise of market power with respect to the rele-
vant research and development, for example by limiting the ability and 
incentive of a hypothetical monopolist to retard the pace of research 
and development. 
Id. § 3.2.3, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,132 (Apr. 6, 1995). 
80.  Joseph Kattan, Perspectives on the 1995 Intellectual Property Guidelines, 
ANTITRUST, Summer 1995, at 12. 
81.  Id. (citing Guidelines § 4.3 and Example 4). 
82.  See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. 
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exclusive agreements.  This exclusion would necessarily in-
clude open collective standard-setting consortia.  Section 
4.1.2 states, in relevant part:  
A non-exclusive license of intellectual property that 
does not contain any restraints on the competitive 
conduct of the licensor or the licensee generally does 
not present antitrust concerns even if the parties to 
the license are in a horizontal relationship, because 
the non-exclusive license normally does not diminish 
competition that would occur in its absence.83 
Thus, all the potential harms,84 that flow from the very 
fact that the openness of the standard increases the likeli-
hood that the standard will be accepted due to network ex-
ternalities, are beyond the reach of the Guidelines. 
The Guidelines, however, are not the only source of in-
formation concerning the agencies’ permissive policy to-
ward open standard-setting consortia.  The cases filed by 
both the FTC and the Justice Department indicate that the 
lack of restrictive licensing arrangements will inoculate a 
standard-setting consortia from antitrust scrutiny.  This con-
clusion follows from the fact that those cases brought by the 
agencies that alleged anticompetitive interference with inno-
vation have all been resolved when the party under investi-
gation agreed to openly license its technology.85  Thus, as in 
the Guidelines, the United States enforcement agencies do 
not show any appreciation for the fact that, in network in-
 
83.  1995 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GUIDELINES, supra note 78, § 4.1.2, reprinted 
in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,132 (Apr. 6, 1995). 
84.  See supra part I.B. 
85.  See, e.g., United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass’n, 1982-83 Trade Cas. 
(CCH) ¶ 65,088 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (Justice Department consent decree resolving 
alleged conspiracy by auto manufacturers to obstruct the development of pollu-
tion control devices by mandating compulsory non-exclusive licensing); In re 
American Home Prods., 59 Fed. Reg. 60,807 (1994) (FTC consent order resolving 
alleged anticompetitive harm to research and development of Rotavirus vaccine 
by combination of pharmaceutical companies by mandating compulsory licens-
ing of relevant technology); cf. Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 303-04 (plaintiff, Berkey 
Photo, sought remedy of mandatory disclosure of product innovations). 
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dustries, open licensing may only further reduce pro-
competitive investments in innovation by improving the 
perception that consumers will adopt a particular standard, 
thereby coercing rivals into acceptance. 
B. European Union Enforcement 
The basis of competition policy in the European Union 
(“EU”) lies within Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty.86  Ar-
ticle 85(1) prohibits agreements and concerted practices be-
tween two or more enterprises that restrict competition 
within the EU.87  Article 85(3) permits the Commission of the 
European Communities (“Commission”) to grant exemp-
tions to firms whose activities fall under Article 85(1).88  The 
 
86. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7. 1992, [1992] 1 
C.M.L.R. 573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by Treaty on 
European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 31 
I.L.M. 247. 
87.  Id. art. 85(1), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626.  According to Article 85(1) of the 
EC Treaty:  
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common 
market:  all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associa-
tions of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade 
between Member States and which have as their object or effect the pre-
vention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common 
market, and in particular this which:  (a) directly or indirectly fix pur-
chase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; (b) limit or con-
trol production, markets, technical development, or investment; (c) 
share markets or sources of supply; (d) apply dissimilar conditions to 
equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them 
at a competitive disadvantage; (e) make the conclusion of contracts sub-
ject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations 
which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no con-
nection with the subject of such contracts. 
Id. 
88.  Id. art. 85(3), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626.  According to Article 85(3) of the 
EC Treaty:  
The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inappli-
cable in the case of:  (a) any agreement or category of agreements be-
tween undertakings; (b) any decision or category of decisions by asso-
ciations of undertakings; (c) any concerted practice or category of 
concerted practices; which contributes to improving the production or 
distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, 
while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and 
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Commission, in addition to having the power to grant indi-
vidual exemptions under Article 85(3), also promulgates 
block exemptions that instruct firms that the Commission 
will not challenge specified conduct, thereby allowing firms 
to engage in such conduct without notifying the Commis-
sion.  Generally, block exemptions contain three “lists” of 
practices:  a “black” list, containing prohibited practices; a 
“gray” list, containing permitted practices; and a “white” list, 
prescribing practices required to qualify for the exemption.89 
The Commission has promulgated two block exemptions 
under which open standard-setting consortia are almost 
completely inoculated from the danger of scrutiny by the 
Commission.  The first block exemption applies to research 
and development joint ventures, which, as mentioned above, 
are similar to standard-setting consortia in that a combina-
tion of firms agree to pursue a unified research objective.90  
The second block exemption applies to licensing of intellec-
tual property, the provisions of which are even more lenient 
than the U.S. Guidelines.91  Because both of these block ex-
emptions contain gray lists allowing consortia members to 
establish exclusive rights and licenses, it is a near certainty 
that the exemptions will cover the traditionally 
less-suspicious open access to industry interface standards 
that an open standard-setting consortium affords to all par-
ties.92 
                                                                                                                                  
which does not:  (i) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions 
which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; (ii) af-
ford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in re-
spect of a substantial part of the products in question. 
Id. 
89. Maria Sendra, Strategic Alliances for Innovation in the Global Market of the 
1990s:  A Comparative Study of the Relationship Between Innovation and the Pat-
ent/Antitrust Mechanisms of the United States and the European Economic Community, 
9 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 382, 389-90 (1992). 
90. Commission Regulation No. 418/85, O.J. L 53/5 (1985); see also supra 
note 78. 
91. Commission Regulation No. 2349/84, O.J. L 113/34 (1985). 
92. See Nhat D. Phan, Leveling the Playing Field:  Harmonization of Antitrust 
Guidelines for International Patent Licensing Agreements in the United States, Japan, 
and the European Union, 10 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 447, 464 n.90 (1994); see gen-
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Taken together, these block exemptions allow members 
of open standard-setting consortia to take advantage of the 
potential anticompetitive effects discussed above in Part I:  
to establish barriers to entry to innovation markets; to coerce 
inefficient over-investment in upgrades; and to leverage fu-
ture market power by basing standards on technologies that 
favor consortia members in order to capture first-mover ad-
vantages and trademark identification. 
III. PRACTICAL IMPEDIMENTS TO A MORE RIGOROUS ANTITRUST 
REVIEW 
The fact that the current United States and European en-
forcement strategies allow for anticompetitive harm to flow 
virtually unchecked from open standard-setting consortia 
does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the antitrust 
enforcement agencies ought to increase their intervention.  
After all, as a former Assistant Attorney General at the Anti-
trust Division observed, “the essential insight of the ‘Chi-
cago School’ is not that markets work perfectly, but rather 
that the market generally works better than government in-
tervention.”93  In the case of monitoring open standard-
setting consortia for the presence of anticompetitive abuse, 
that insight can be powerfully applied. 
The first impediment to crafting more rigorous antitrust 
review of open standard-setting consortia is that intrusive 
examination can cause delays in technological advancement 
that outweigh the benefits of catching, or even deterring, 
anticompetitive behavior.  If the purpose of antitrust review 
is to promote socially beneficial innovation, then the review 
itself must be careful not to impose delays—compliance with 
CIDs94 or lengthy litigation—that would deter firms from 
                                                                                                                                  
erally A. Lynne Puckett, European Competition Law:  Managing the “Chameleon” of 
Antitrust-Technology Joint Ventures, 19 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 47 (1995). 
93. Charles F. Rule, Claims of Predation in a Competitive Market Place:  When Is 
an Antitrust Response Appropriate?, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 421, 426 (1988). 
94.  A CID or “civil investigative demand” is a procedure whereby the Anti-
trust Division of the Justice Department may compel, without filing a complaint, 
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investing in innovation or bringing that innovation to the 
market.95 
Second, the concern of the Berkey Photo court—that the 
courts are institutionally ill-suited to determine the competi-
tive merit of technological standards96—not only remains, 
but may also apply with equal force to the government en-
forcement agencies.  Interface standards are likely to involve 
highly technical specifications.97  Attempting to determine 
whether technical specifications are incorporated into a 
standard for pro-competitive technology-enhancing pur-
poses, or anticompetitive innovation inhibiting purposes, 
may be a task beyond the competence of either the govern-
ment or the courts.  This is especially true in network indus-
tries where reliance on market acceptance of a standard, the 
method used by the Berkey Photo court, may not be an accu-
rate indicator of that standard’s social value. 
Third, there is no reliable (or perhaps even conceivable) 
objective standard for determining the efficient level of in-
novation in the absence of an open standard-setting consor-
tium.  Part of the problem is that the economics that describe 
the potential harms caused by open standard-setting consor-
tia is still in its infancy and thus not fully developed.98  
Economists studying the antitrust implications of networks 
have advanced to the stage of identifying the harm, but not 
to the point of establishing a usable test for determining 
whether that harm has manifested.99  Without such a test, 
the prevention of anticompetitive harm may fail to outweigh 
                                                                                                                                  
the production of documentary material to determine whether there has been a 
civil violation of the antitrust laws.  15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1311-1314 (West Supp. 1996). 
95. See Jorde & Teece, supra note 64, at 590. 
96.  Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 286-87 (2d Cir. 
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). 
97. See, e.g., DVDs Agreement:  Who Won, Who Lost?, CONSUMER ELECTRONICS, 
Sept. 25, 1995, at 13. 
98.  See Jorde & Teece, supra note 64, at 590; Shapiro, supra note 59. 
99.  Compare Ordover & Willig, supra note 56, 52-53 (arguing that such objec-
tive standards are economically definable) with Sidak, supra note 73, 1121 (argu-
ing that the standard advanced by Ordover and Willig misses many important 
pro-competitive aspects of innovation and favoring a per se validity approach). 
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the costs of intervention. 
Finally, because of the difficulties in constructing a post-
agreement test for the presence of anticompetitive harm 
caused by an open standard-setting consortium, the spon-
sors of rival, but inferior, non-standard technology could 
manipulate the courts into forcing the open standard-setting 
consortium to accept the rival’s inferior standard.  In fact, 
some commentators have suggested that this very scenario 
has already arisen100 in Addamax Corp. v. Open Software Foun-
dation, Inc.101 
Addamax involves the very issues of potential anticom-
petitive harm that form the basis of this Essay.  Addamax is 
a manufacturer/producer of security systems for computer 
operating systems.102  The Open Software Foundation 
(“OSF”) is an open standard-setting consortium formed for 
the purpose of standardizing computer operating system 
software.103  The OSF was founded by some of the largest 
computer companies in the world, including IBM, Hewlett-
Packard, and Digital.104  Because of the market share of its 
members, the OSF standard generally gains immediate con-
sumer acceptance. 
The OSF chose to incorporate into its operating system a 
security system manufactured by a rival of Addamax.  Ad-
damax claimed that this selection was based not on the price 
or quality of the rival system, but rather on the desire to 
benefit the incumbent technology of certain OSF members.105  
Addamax further claimed that the OSF’s selection was anti-
competitive because the presence of network externalities 
insured that the selected (and supposedly inferior) technol-
ogy was guaranteed acceptance in the market, to the exclu-
 
100.  Kattan, supra note 15, at 5. 
101.  888 F. Supp. 274 (D. Mass. 1995). 
102.  Id. at 276. 
103.  Id. at 277. 
104.  Id. 
105.  Id. at 278. 
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sion of Addamax’s supposedly superior technology.106  The 
court found this allegation sufficient to survive OSF’s sum-
mary judgment motion.107 
There are at least two problems presented by Addamax.  
First, by what standard is a court to judge Addamax’s soft-
ware technologically superior to its rival’s?108  Second, even 
if such a comparison is possible and Addamax can make a 
compelling case that its software is technologically superior, 
how would a court balance the harm to competition posed 
by a reduction in technological advancement against the sig-
nificant benefits of standardization?  The difficulties in solv-
ing these problems represent the real impediments to a more 
proactive scrutiny of open standard-setting consortia by 
United States and European enforcement authorities. 
IV. PROPOSAL FOR INCREASED ANTITRUST SCRUTINY OF OPEN 
STANDARD-SETTING CONSORTIA 
Despite the impediments, and given the difficulties in ac-
curately assess balancing the pro-competitive benefits and 
anticompetitive harms posed by open standard-setting con-
sortia, some degree of scrutiny is necessary to prevent “the 
formation of groups whose intent is to use standard setting 
as a cloak for anticompetitive activities.”109  Fortunately, 
there are at least two steps that the enforcement agencies can 
take to reduce the potential for abuse presented by these 
consortia, without unduly burdening them or slowing the 
introduction of innovation in the market. 
First, enforcement agencies can examine the process by 
 
106.  Addamax, 888 F. Supp. at 284-85. 
107.  Id. 
108.  The court never had to reach this question because Addamax was able 
to make a threshold showing that the rival was selected without regard for tech-
nological merit, which was sufficient to allow it to survive summary judgment.  
Id. at 280.  This type of evidence presents a potential avenue for increased scru-
tiny by the enforcement agencies.  See infra part IV. 
109.  James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, Standard-Setting Consortia, Antitrust, 
and High Technology Industries, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 247, 264 (1995). 
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which collective standard-setting consortia settle upon a 
standard.  This examination need not focus on technical de-
terminations of the superiority of superior standards.  In-
stead, the agencies can focus on such factors as access to the 
consortium by an array of rival firms, procedural fairness in 
selecting the technology to adopt, and genuineness of crite-
ria used to evaluate rival technologies.  The Addamax court 
validated the merit of this type of examination when the 
court rejected OSF’s summary judgment motion upon a 
proffer that the consortium was disingenuous in evaluating 
the technological merits of the rival software systems.110  Of 
course, a finding of procedural defects does not substitute 
for a finding of anticompetitive effect;111 however, given the 
pro-competitive benefits of standard-setting consortia, ex-
amination of procedural defects could help screen out those 
consortia where the burden of delay is likely to outweigh the 
benefits of examination. 
Second, the agencies could engage in a “quick look” rule 
of reason analysis where the presumption is for validity.  Es-
sentially, this approach would ask whether there is a reason-
able basis on the merits for the promulgated standard.  
While some technical investigation is necessary under this 
approach, the liability threshold would be placed high 
enough to eliminate much of the burden on the pro-
competitive standard-setting consortium to justify its stan-
dard.  Factors such as the market position or technological 
advantages of the consortium members could be examined, 
as could evidence proffered by the opponents of the stan-
dard.  However, to avoid the potential for misuse by com-
petitors promoting technologically inferior products, the ap-
proach would permit the promulgated standard even if the 
 
110.  Addamax, 888 F. Supp. at 285.  But see Northwest Wholesale Stationers 
v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 293 (1985) (“the absence of pro-
cedural safeguards can in no sense determine antitrust analysis . . . because the 
antitrust laws do not themselves impose on joint ventures a requirement of proc-
ess”). 
111.  Northwest Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 293. 
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evidence were to weigh in favor of a rival standard.  All that 
would be required is some credible showing that the prom-
ulgated standard can reasonably be supported on the mer-
its.112 
CONCLUSION 
There is little doubt that open standards can have pro-
competitive effects in the market for high technology goods.  
Consumers obviously benefit from capturing network exter-
nalities:  using and exchanging interchangeable DVDs, CDs, 
and floppy disks.  Producers benefit by avoiding inefficient 
investment in incompatible, non-superior technology.  How-
ever, the question of whether these and other benefits of 
open standards justify the relaxation of antitrust’s traditional 
mistrust of horizontal agreements must be carefully consid-
ered given the potential for the anti-competitive market ma-
nipulation by standard setting consortia.  Consumers may 
end up as net losers when the gains from standardization are 
balanced against the losses of reduced extra-standard inno-
vation and inefficient manipulation of technology selection 
in favor of consortia members. 
Unfortunately, it may well be beyond the competence of 
the antitrust enforcement agencies to accurately and effi-
ciently perform such a balancing.  However, the enforcement 
agencies should not permit this difficulty to become an ex-
cuse for abdicating their mandate to ensure and promote ac-
tive competition.  Instead, by examining the fairness and 
genuineness of a consortium’s standard-setting process and 
by performing a “quick look” review of the merits of a pro-
posed standard, the enforcement agencies can thwart those 
that would abuse open standard-setting consortia without 
jeopardizing the efficiency-enhancing effects generated by 
standards in network industries. 
While these steps may not stop all abuses, they would do 
 
112.  See Anton & Yao, supra note 109, at 264. 
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more to prevent abuse than does the virtual per se validity 
given to open standard-setting consortia by United States 
and European enforcement agencies today.  Though it may 
be true that, on the whole, the pro-competitive benefits of 
open standard-setting consortia outweigh the potential 
harms, one must remember that “government policies and 
private responses to policy interact.”113  Without some level 
of government scrutiny, therefore, the anticompetitive po-
tential of open standard-setting consortia may move from 
predominantly theoretical to distressingly manifest. 
 
 
113.  Id. 
